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Abstract
The methods used to establish PSPACE -bounds for modal logics can roughly be grouped
into two classes: syntax driven methods establish that exhaustive proof search can be
performed in polynomial space whereas semantic approaches directly construct shallow
models. In this paper, we follow the latter approach and establish generic PSPACE -
bounds for a large and heterogeneous class of modal logics in a coalgebraic framework.
In particular, no complete axiomatisation of the logic under scrutiny is needed. This
does not only complement our earlier, syntactic, approach conceptually, but also covers
a wide variety of new examples which are difficult to harness by purely syntactic means.
Apart from re-proving known complexity bounds for a large variety of structurally different
logics, we apply our method to obtain previously unknown PSPACE -bounds for Elgesem’s
logic of agency and for graded modal logic over reflexive frames.
1 Introduction
Special purpose modal logics often combine expressivity and decidability, usually in a low
complexity class. In the absence of fixed point operators, these logics are frequently decidable
in PSPACE, i.e. not dramatically worse than propositional logic. While lower PSPACE
bounds for modal logics can typically be obtained directly from seminal results of Ladner [20]
by embedding a PSPACE-hard logic such as K or KD, upper bounds are often non-trivial to
establish. In particular PSPACE upper bounds for non-normal logics have recently received
much attention:
• A PSPACE upper bound for graded modal logic [11] is obtained using a constraint set
algorithm in [30]. This corrects a previously published incorrect algorithm and refutes a
previous EXPTIME hardness conjecture.
• More recently, a PSPACE upper bound for Presburger modal logic (which contains
graded modal logic and majority logic [23]) has been established using a Ladner-type algo-
rithm [6] .
• Using a variant of a shallow neighbourhood frame construction from [31], a PSPACE
upper bound for coalition logic is established in [26].
• PSPACE upper bounds for CK and related conditional logics [3] are obtained in [22] by
a detailed proof-theoretic analysis of a labelled sequent calculus.
The methods used to obtain these results can be broadly grouped into two classes. Syntac-
tic approaches presuppose a complete tableaux or Gentzen system and establish that proof
search can be performed in polynomial space. Semantics-driven approaches, on the other
hand, directly construct shallow tree models. Both approaches are intimately connected in
the case of normal modal logics interpreted over Kripke frames: counter models can usually
be derived directly from search trees [16]. It should be noted that this method is not immedi-
ately applicable in the non-normal case, where the structure of models often goes far beyond
mere graphs.
Using coalgebraic techniques, we have previously shown [29] that the syntactic approach
uniformly generalises to a large class of modal logics: starting from a one-step complete ax-
iomatisation, we have applied resolution closure to obtain complete tableaux systems. Generic
PSPACE-bounds follow if the ensuing rule set is PSPACE-tractable. Here, we present a differ-
ent, semantic, set of methods to establish uniform PSPACE bounds by directly constructing
shallow models for logics subject to the one-step polysize model property, or a variant of the
latter. In particular, no axiomatisation of the logic itself is needed.
Apart from the fact that both methods use substantially different techniques, they apply
to different classes of examples. While it is e.g. relatively easy to obtain a resolution closed rule
set for coalition logic [26], proving the one-step polysize model property for (the coalgebraic
semantics of) coalition logic is a non-trivial task. On the other hand, small one-step models
are comparatively easy to construct for complex modal logics such as probabilistic modal
logic [8] or Presburger modal logic [6] that are not straightforwardly amenable to the syntactic
approach via resolution closure, either because no axiomatisation has been given or because
the complexity of the axiomatisation makes the resolution closure hard to harness.
Moreover, the present semantic approach to PSPACE-bounds takes a significant step to
overcome an important barrier in the coalgebraic treatment of modal logics. Existing decid-
ability and completeness results [25, 5, 28, 29] are limited to rank-1 logics, given by axioms
whose modal nesting depth is uniformly equal to one. While this already encompasses a large
class of examples (including all logics mentioned so far), the semantic model construction in
the present paper applies to non-iterative logics [21], i.e. logics axiomatised without nested
modalities (rank-1 logics additionally exclude top-level propositional variables). Despite the
seemingly minute difference between the two classes of logics, this generalisation is not only
technically non-trivial but also substantially extends the scope of the coalgebraic method.
Besides the modal logic T , the class of non-iterative logics includes e.g. all conditional logics
covered in [22] (of which only 4 are rank-1), in particular CK+MP [3], as well as Elgesem’s
logic of agency [7, 12] and the graded version Tn of T [11].
As in [29], we work in the framework of coalgebraic modal logic [25] to obtain results that
are parametric in the underlying semantics of particular logics. While normal modal logics
are usually interpreted over Kripke frames, non-normal logics see a large variety of different
semantics, e.g. probabilistic systems [8], frames with ordered branching [6], game frames [26],
or conditional frames [3]. The coalgebraic treatment allows us to encapsulate the semantics
in the choice of a signature functor, whose coalgebras then play the role of models, leading to
results that are unformly applicable to a large class of different logics.
Since the class of all coalgebras for a given signature functor can always be completely
axiomatised in rank 1 [28], in analogy to the fact that the K-axioms are complete for the
class of all Kripke frames, the standard coalgebraic approach is not directly applicable to non-
iterative logics. To overcome this limitation, we introduce the new concept of interpreting
modal logics over coalgebras for copointed functors, i.e. functors T equipped with a natural
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transformation of type T → Id .
In this setting, our main technical tool is to cut back model constructions from modal
logics to the level of one-step logics which semantically do not involve state transitions, and
then amalgamate the corresponding one-step models into shallow models for the full modal
logic, which ideally can be traversed in polynomial space. For this approach to work, the
logic at hand needs to support a small model property for its one-step fragment, the one-step
polysize model property (OSPMP). Our first main theorem shows that the OSPMP guarantees
decidability in polynomial space. Crucially, the OSPMP is much easier to establish than a
shallow model property for the logic itself. To reprove e.g. Ladner’s PSPACE upper bound
for K, one just observes that to construct a set that intersects n given sets, one needs at most
n elements. For the conditional logics CK , CK+ID , and CK+MP , the OSPMP is similarly
easy to check. For other logics, in particular various logics of quantitative uncertainty, the
OSPMP can be obtained by sharpening known off-the-shelf results. As a new result, we
establish the OSPMP for Elgesem’s logic of agency to obtain a previously unknown PSPACE
upper bound.
As a by-product of our construction, we obtain NP-bounds for the bounded rank fragments
of all logics with the OSPMP, generalizing the corresponding result for the logics K and T
from [13] to a large variety of structurally different (non-iterative) logics.
While the OSPMP is usually easy to establish, a weaker property, the one-step pointwise
polysize model property (OSPPMP), can be used in cases where the OSPMP fails, provided
that the signature functor supports a notion of pointwise smallness for overall exponential-
sized one-step models. This allows traversing exponentially branching shallow models in
polynomial space by dealing with the successor structures of single states in a pointwise
fashion. Our second main result, which yields PSPACE upper bounds for logics with the
OSPPMP, is applied to reprove the known PSPACE bound for Presburger modal logic [6]
and to derive a new PSPACE bound for Presburger modal logic over reflexive frames, and
hence for Tn [11] (which was so far only known to be decidable [10]). The latter result extends
straightforwardly to a description logic with role hierarchies, qualified number restrictions,
and reflexive roles.
2 Coalgebraic Modal Logic
We recall the coalgebraic interpretation of modal logic and extend it to non-iterative logics
using copointed functors.
A modal signature Λ is a set of modal operators with associated finite arity. The signature
Λ determines two languages: firstly, the one-step logic of Λ, whose formulas ψ, . . . (the one-
step formulas) over a set V of propositional variables are defined by the grammar
ψ ::= ⊥ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | ¬ψ | L(φ1, . . . , φn),
where L ∈ Λ is n-ary and the φi are propositional formulas over V ; and secondly, the modal
logic of Λ, whose set F(Λ) of Λ-formulas ψ, . . . is defined by the grammar
ψ ::= ⊥ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | ¬ψ | L(ψ1, . . . , ψn).
Thus, the modal logic of Λ is distinguished from the one-step logic in that it admits nested
modalities. The boolean operations ∨, →, ↔, ⊤ are defined as usual. The rank rank(φ)
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of φ ∈ F(Λ) is the maximal nesting depth of modalities in φ (note however that the notion
of rank-1 logic [28, 29] is stricter than suggested by this definition, as it excludes top-level
propositional variables in axioms; the latter are allowed only in non-iterative logics). We
denote by Fn(Λ) the set of formulas of rank at most n; we refer to the languages Fn(Λ) as
bounded-rank fragments.
We treat one-step logics as a technical tool in the study of modal logics. However, one-
step logics also appear as logics of independent interest in the literature [9, 14, 15]. One of
the central ideas of coalgebraic modal logic is that properties of the full modal logic, such as
soundness, completeness, and decidability, can be reduced to properties of the much simpler
one-step logic. This is also the spirit of the present work, whose core is a construction of
polynomially branching shallow models for the modal logic assuming a small model property
for the one-step logic.
The semantics of both the one-step logic and the modal logic of Λ are parametrized
coalgebraically by the choice of a set functor. The standard setup of coalgebraic modal logic
using all coalgebras for a plain set functor covers only rank-1 logics, i.e. logics axiomatised
one-step formulas [28] (a typical example is the K-axiom (a → b) → a → b). Here, we
improve on this by considering the class of coalgebras for a given copointed set functor, which
enables us to cover the more general class of non-iterative logics, axiomatised by arbitrary
formulas without nested modalities (such as the T -axiom a → a). We follow a purely
semantic approach and hence do not formally consider axiomatisations in the present work
(where we do mention axioms, this is for solely explanatory purposes). However, the extended
scope of the new framework and its relation to non-iterative modal logics (which can be made
precise in the same way as for plain functors and rank-1 logics [28]) will become clear in the
examples.
In general, a copointed functor (T, ǫ) consists of a functor T : Set → Set, where Set is
the category of sets, and a natural transformation ǫ : T → Id . For our present purposes, a
slightly restricted notion is more convenient:
Definition 2.1. A (restricted) copointed functor S with signature functor S0 : Set → Set is
a subfunctor of S0 × Id (where (S0 × Id)X = S0X ×X). We say that S is trivially copointed
if S = S0 × Id . An S-coalgebra A = (X, ξ) consists of a set X of states and a transition
function ξ : X → S0X such that (ξ(x), x) ∈ SX for all x.
Remark 2.2. The modal logic F(Λ) does not explicitly include propositional variables. These
may be regarded as nullary modal operators in Λ; their semantics is then defined over coal-
gebras for S0 × P(V ), where V is the set of variables (cf. also e.g. [28]). We omit discussion
of propositional variables in the examples, even in cases like the modal logic of probability
that become trivial in the absence of variables; our treatment extends straightforwardly to
the case with variables in the manner just indicated.
We view coalgebras as generalized transition systems: the transition function maps a state
to a structured set of successors and observations, with the structure prescribed by the sig-
nature functor. Thus, the latter encapsulates the branching type of the underlying transition
systems. Copointed functors additionally impose local frame conditions that relate a state to
the collection of its successors.
Assumption 2.3. We assume w.l.o.g. that S0 preserves injective maps [2], and even S0X ⊆
S0Y in case X ⊆ Y , and that S is non-trivial, i.e. SX = ∅ ⇒ X = ∅.
4
Generalising earlier work (e.g. [17, 19]), coalgebraic modal logic abstractly captures the inter-
pretation of modal operators as polyadic predicate liftings [25, 27],
Definition 2.4. An n-ary predicate lifting (n ∈ N) for S0 is a natural transformation
λ : Qn → Q ◦ Sop0 ,
where Q denotes the contravariant powerset functor Setop → Set (i.e. QX is the powerset
P(X), and Qf(A) = f−1[A]), and Qn is defined by QnX = (QX)n.
A coalgebraic semantics for Λ is formally defined as a Λ-structure M (over S) consisting of
a copointed functor S with signature functor S0 and an assignment of an n-ary predicate
lifting [[L]] for S0 to every n-ary modal operator L ∈ Λ. When S is trivially copointed, we
will also call M a simple Λ-structure (over S0). We fix the notation Λ, M, S, S0 throughout
the paper. The semantics of the modal language F(Λ) is then given in terms of a satisfaction
relation |=C between states x of S-coalgebras C = (X, ξ) and F(Λ)-formulas over V . The
relation |=C is defined inductively, with the usual clauses for boolean operators. The clause
for an n-ary modal operator L is
x |=C L(φ1, . . . , φn) ⇔ ξ(x) ∈ [[L]]([[φ1]]C , . . . , [[φn]]C)
where [[φ]]C = {x ∈ X | x |=C φ}. We drop the subscripts C when clear from the context.
Our main interest is in the (local) satisfiability problem over M:
Definition 2.5. An F(Λ)-formula φ is satisfiable if there exist an S-coalgebra C and a state
x in C such that x |=C φ. Dually, φ is valid if x |=C φ for all C, x.
Contrastingly, the semantics of the one-step logic is given in terms of satisfaction relations
|=1X,τ between elements t ∈ S0X and one-step formulas over V , where X is a set and τ is
a P(X)-valuation for V , i.e. a map τ : V → P(X). The valuation τ canonically induces
an interpretation of [[φ]]0τ ⊆ X of propositional formulas φ over V . We write X, τ |=0 φ if
[[φ]]0τ = X. The relation |=1X,τ is then defined by the usual clauses for boolean operators, and
t |=1X,τ L(φ1, . . . , φn) ⇔ t ∈ [[L]]([[φ1]]
0τ, . . . , [[φn]]
0τ).
Note in particular that the semantics of the one-step logic does not involve a notion of state
transition.
Definition 2.6. A one-step model (X, τ, t, x) over V consists of a set X, a P(X)-valuation
τ for V , t ∈ S0X, and x ∈ X such that (t, x) ∈ SX. The latter condition is vacuous if S is
trivially copointed, in which case we omit the mention of x. For a one-step formula ψ over
V , (X, τ, t, x) is a one-step model of ψ if t |=1X,τ ψ.
We recall some basic notation:
Definition 2.7. We denote the set of propositional formulas over a set Z, generated by the
basic connectives ¬ and ∧, by Prop(Z). We use variables ǫ etc. to denote either nothing or
¬. Thus, a literal over Z is a formula of the form ǫa, with a ∈ Z. A (conjunctive) clause
is a finite, possibly empty, disjunction (conjunction) of literals. We denote by Λ(Z) the set
{L(a1, . . . , an) | L ∈ Λ n-ary, a1, . . . , an ∈ Z}.
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In the above notation, the set of one-step formulas over V is Prop(Λ(Prop(V ))). The one-step
logic may alternatively be presented in terms of pairs of formulas separating out the lower
propositional layer:
Definition 2.8. A one-step pair (φ,ψ) over V consists of formulas ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(V )) and
φ ∈ Prop(V ). A one-step model (X, τ, t, x) is a one-step model of (φ,ψ) if X, τ |=0 φ and
t |=1X,τ ψ.
In analogy to the equivalence between axioms and one-step rules described in [28], one-step
pairs and one-step formulas may replace each other for purposes of satisfiability:
Lemma 2.9. For every one-step pair (φ,ψ) over V with φ satisfiable, there exists a Prop(V )-
substitution σ such that the one-step formula ψσ is equivalent to (φ,ψ) in the sense that if
t |=1X,τ ψσ then t |=
1
X,στ (φ,ψ), and if t |=
1
X,τ (φ,ψ) then t |=
1
X,τ ψσ (and στ = τ). Here, στ
denotes the P(X)-valuation taking a to [[σ(a)]]0τ .
Conversely, we have, for ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(Prop(V ))), an equivalent one-step pair (φ,ψ1) over
V ∪W , where ψ decomposes as ψ ≡ ψ1σ, with ψ1 ∈ Prop(Λ(W )), σ a Prop(V )-substitution,
and V ∩W = ∅, and where φ is the conjunction of the formulas a ↔ σ(a), a ∈ W . Here,
restricting valuations to V induces a bijection between one-step models of (φ,ψ1) and one-step
models of ψ.
Proof. The second claim is clear. The first claim is proved as follows. As in [28], let κ be
a satisfying truth valuation for φ and put σ(a) = a ∧ φ if κ(a) = ⊥, and σ(a) = φ → a
otherwise. Then φσ and the formulas φ → (a↔ σ(a)), for a ∈ V , are tautologies [28]. Both
directions of the first claim now follow straightforwardly.
The coalgebraic approach subsumes many interesting modal logics, including e.g. graded and
probabilistic modal logics and coalition logic [29]. Below, we present the most basic examples,
the modal logics K and T , as well as various conditional logics and logics of quantitative
uncertainty. The treatment of Elgesem’s modal logic of agency is deferred to Sect. 4.
Example 2.10. 1. Modal logic K: Let Λ = {}, with  a unary modal operator. We
define a simple Λ-structure over the covariant powerset functor P (i.e. PX is powerset, and
Pf(A) = f [A]) by putting [[]]X(A) = {B ∈ PX | B ⊆ A}. Naturality of [[]] is just the
equivalence f [B] ⊆ A ⇐⇒ B ⊆ f−1[A].
P-coalgebras are Kripke frames, and P-models are Kripke models. The modal logic of Λ
is precisely the modal logic K, equipped with its standard Kripke semantics. Contrastingly,
a one-step formula over V is a propositional combination of atoms of the form φ, where
φ ∈ Prop(V ). For A ∈ PX, we have A |=1X,τ φ iff A ⊆ [[φ]]
0τ . One easily checks that the
one-step logic is NP-complete, while the modal logic K is PSPACE-complete [20].
2. Modal logic T : The logic T has the same syntax as K. Its coalgebraic semantics is a
structure over the copointed functor R with signature functor P, given by
RX = {(A, x) ∈ PX ×X | x ∈ A}.
Thus, R-coalgebras are reflexive Kripke frames. The interpretation of  is defined as for K.
(Axiomatically, T is determined by the non-iterative axiom a→ a.)
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3. Conditional logic CK: The signature of conditional logic has a single binary modal op-
erator ⇒, written in infix notation. Formulas φ⇒ ψ are read as non-monotonic conditionals.
The semantics of the conditional logic CK [3] is given by a simple structure over the functor
Cf given by Cf (X) = (QX → PX), with → denoting function space and Q contravariant
powerset, cf. Definition 2.4. Cf -coalgebras are conditional frames [3]. The operator ⇒ is
interpreted over Cf by
[[⇒]]X(A,B) = {f : QX → PX | f(A) ⊆ B}.
4. Conditional logic CK+ID: The conditional logic CK+ID [3] extends CK with the rank-1
axiom a ⇒ a, referred to as ID . The semantics of CK +ID is modelled by restricting the
structure for CK to the subfunctor CfID of Cf defined by
CfID(X) = {f ∈ Cf (X) | ∀A ∈ QX. f(A) ⊆ A}.
5. Conditional Logic CK+MP: The logic CK+MP [3] extends CK with the non-iterative
axiom
(MP) (a⇒ b)→ (a→ b).
(This axiom is undesirable in default logics, but reasonable in relevance logics.) Semantically,
this amounts to passing from the functor Cf to the copointed functor CfMP with signature
functor Cf , defined by
CfMP (X) = {(f, x) ∈ Cf (X) ×X | ∀A ⊆ X.x ∈ A⇒ x ∈ f(A)}.
6. Modal logics of quantitative uncertainty: The modal signature of likelihood has n-ary
modal operators
∑n
i=1 ail( ) ≥ b for a1, . . . , a1, b ∈ Q. The terms l(φ) are called likelihoods.
The interpretation of likelihoods varies. E.g. the semantics of the modal logic of probabil-
ity [8] is modelled coalgebraically by a structure over the (finite) distribution functor Dω,
where DωX is the set of finitely supported probability distributions on X, and Dωf acts as
image measure formation. Coalgebras for Dω are probabilistic transition systems (i.e. Markov
chains). Likelihoods are interpreted as probabilities; i.e.
[[
∑n
i=1 ai · l( ) ≥ b]]X(A1, . . . , An) = {P ∈ DωX |
∑n
i=1 aiP (Ai) ≥ b}.
Alternatively, likelihoods may be interpreted as upper probabilities [14], i.e. the functor Dω
is replaced by P ◦ Dω, and in the above definition, P (Ai) is replaced by P
∗(Ai), where for
P ∈ PDωX, P
∗(A) = sup {PA | P ∈ P}. This setting describes situations where agents
are unsure about the actual probability distribution. Further alternative notions of likelihood
include Dempster-Shafer belief functions and Dubois-Prade possibility measures [15]. An
extension of the modal signature of likelihood is the modal signature of expectation [15],
where instead of likelihoods one more generally considers expectations e(
∑nk
j=1 bijφij). Here,
linear combinations of formulas represent gambles, i.e. real-valued outcome functions, where
the payoff of φ is the characteristic function of φ. The exact definition of expectation depends
on the underlying notion of likelihood.
One-step logics of quantitative uncertainty are often considered to be of independent in-
terest. E.g. the one-step logic of probability, i.e. a logic without nesting of likelihoods that
talks only about a single probability distribution, is introduced independently [9] and only
later extended to a full modal logic [8]. In fact, logics of expectation [15] and the logic of
upper probability [14] so far appear in the literature only as one-step logics; the corresponding
modal logics are of interest as natural variations of the modal logic of probability.
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Convention 2.11. We assume that Λ is equipped with a size measure, thus inducing a size
measure for F(Λ). For one-step formulas φ over V , we assume w.l.o.g. that |V | ≤ size(φ). For
finite X, we assume given a representation of elements (t, x) ∈ SX as strings of size size(t, x)
over some finite alphabet. We do not require that all elements of SX are representable, nor
that all strings denote elements of SX. When S is trivially copointed, we represent only
t ∈ S0(X). We require that inclusions SX ⊆ SY induced according to Assumption 2.3 by
inclusions X ⊆ Y into a finite base set Y preserve representable elements and increase their
size by at most log |Y |.
We make these issues explicit for the above examples:
Example 2.12. 1. Modal logics K and T : For X finite, elements of PX are represented
as lists of elements of X.
2. Conditional logics CK and CK+ID: For X finite, elements of QX → PX are represented
as partial maps f0 : QX ⇀ PX; such an f0 represents the total map f that extends f0 by
f(A) = ∅ when f0(A) is undefined. (The use of partial maps avoids exponential blowup.)
3. Conditional logic CK +MP: For X finite, a pair (f0, x) consisting of a partial map
f0 : QX ⇀ PX and x ∈ X represents the pair (f, x), where f : QX → PX extends f0 by
f(A) = A ∩ {x} in case f0(A) is undefined.
4. Modal logics of quantitative uncertainty: Suitable compact representations are described
in [9, 14, 15].
3 Polynomially branching shallow models
We now turn to the announced construction of polynomially branching shallow models for
modal logics whose one-step logic has a small model property; this construction leads to a
PSPACE decision procedure.
Definition 3.1. We say that M has the one-step polysize model property (OSPMP) if there
exist polynomials p and q such that, whenever a one-step pair (φ,ψ) over V has a one-step
model (X, τ, t, x), then it has a one-step model (Y, κ, s, y) such that |Y | ≤ p(|ψ|), (s, y) is
representable with size(s, y) ≤ q(|ψ|), and y ∈ κ(a) iff x ∈ τ(a) for all a ∈ V .
In analogy to the transition between rules and axioms described in [28], one-step pairs are
interchangeable with one-step formulas. In particular, we have
Proposition 3.2. The Λ-structure M has the OSPMP iff there exist polynomials p, q such
that, whenever a one-step formula ψ over V has a one-step model (X, τ, t, x), then it has a
one-step model (Y, κ, s, y) such that y ∈ κ(a) iff x ∈ τ(a) for all a ∈ V , |Y | ≤ p(|ψ1|), and
(s, y) is representable with size(s, y) ≤ q(|ψ1|), where ψ ≡ ψ1σ with ψ1 ∈ Prop(Λ(W )) and σ
a Prop(V )-substitution.
Proof. Only if: Let (X, τ, t, x) be a one-step model of a one-step formula ψ over V . By
Lemma 2.9, ψ is equivalent to a one-step pair of the form (φ,ψ1), with ψ1 as in the statement.
By the OSPMP, (φ,ψ1) has a one-step model (Y, κ, s, y) such that |Y | ≤ p(|ψ1|), size(s, y) ≤
q(|ψ1|), and y ∈ κ(a) iff x ∈ τ(a) for all a ∈ V ; by Lemma 2.9, this model gives rise to a
one-step model of ψ with the components Y , s, y unchanged.
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If: Let (X, τ, t, x) be a one-step model of a one-step pair (φ,ψ) over V . By Lemma 2.9,
(φ,ψ) is equivalent to a one-step formula of the form ψσ, where σ is a Prop(V )-substitution.
By assumption, ψσ has a one-step model (Y, κ, s, y) such that |Y | ≤ p(|ψ|), size(s, y) ≤ q(|ψ|),
and y ∈ κ(a) iff x ∈ τ(a) for all a ∈ V . By Lemma 2.9, this model gives rise to a one-step
model of (φ,ψ) with the components Y , s, y unchanged.
Both formulations of the OSPMP easily reduce to the case that ψ is a conjunctive clause.
Remark 3.3. It is shown in [28] that the one-step logic always has an exponential-size model
property: a one-step formula ψ over V has a one-step model iff it has a one-step model with
carrier set P(V ).
We are now ready to prove the shallow model theorem.
Definition 3.4. A supporting Kripke frame of an S-coalgebra (X, ξ) is a Kripke frame (X,R)
such that for each x ∈ X,
ξ(x) ∈ S0{y | xRy} ⊆ S0X
(equivalently (ξ(x), x) ∈ S{y | xRy}). A state x ∈ X is a loop if xRx.
Theorem 3.5 (Shallow model property). If M has the OSPMP, then F(Λ) has the poly-
nomially branching shallow model property: There exist polynomials p, q such that every
satisfiable F(Λ)-formula ψ is satisfiable at the root of an S-coalgebra (X, ξ) which has a sup-
porting Kripke frame (X,R) such that removing all loops from (X,R) yields a tree of depth at
most rank(ψ) and branching degree at most p(|ψ|), and (ξ(x), x) ∈ S{y | xRy} is representable
with size(ξ(x), x) ≤ q(|ψ|).
Definition 3.6. For x ∈ X and a P(X)-valuation τ , we put Thτ (x) ≡
∧
x∈τ(a) a∧
∧
x/∈τ(a) ¬a.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Induction over the rank of ψ. If rank(ψ) = 0, then ψ evaluates to ⊤
and hence is satisfied in a singleton S-coalgebra (X, ξ), which exists by Assumption 2.3.
Now let rank(ψ) = n+1. Let z0 be a state in an S-coalgebra (Z, ζ) such that z0 |=(Z,ζ) ψ.
Let MSub(ψ) denote the set of subformulas of ψ occuring in ψ within the scope of a modal
operator, let V be the set of variables aρ, indexed over ρ ∈ MSub(ψ), and let σ denote the
substitution taking aρ to ρ for all ρ. Let ψ¯ be the conjunction of all literals ǫL(aρ1 , . . . , aρn)
such that L(ρ1, . . . , ρn) is a subformula of ψ and z0 |=(Z,ζ) ǫL(ρ1, . . . , ρn). (Recall that ǫ
denotes either nothing or negation.) Moreover, let φ denote the propositional theory of σ, i.e.
the conjunction of all clauses χ over V such that χσ is L-valid.
Then (Z, κ, ζ(z0), z0) is a one-step model of (φ, ψ¯), where κ(a) = [[σ(a)]](Z,ζ). By the
OSPMP, it follows that (φ, ψ¯) has a one-step model (Y, τ, t, x0) of polynomial size in |ψ¯| such
that for all ρ ∈ MSub(ψ1), x0 ∈ τ(aρ) iff z0 ∈ κ(ρ), which in turn is equivalent to z0 |=(Z,ζ) ρ.
From this model, we now construct a shallow model (X, ξ) for ψ. To begin, note that
Thτ (y)σ is L-satisfiable for every y ∈ Y . For suppose not; then ¬Thτ (y)σ is L-valid, hence
¬Thτ (y) is a conjunct of φ. Thus, Y, τ |=
0 ¬Thτ (y), in contradiction to the fact that y ∈
[[Thτ (y)]]τ by construction. By induction, we thus have, for every y ∈ Y , a shallow model
(Xy, ξy) of Thτ (y)σ, where we may assume y ∈ Xy and y |=(Xy ,ξy) Thτ (y)σ, with depth at most
rank(Thτ (y)σ) = n. We take (X, ξ) as the disjoint union of the (Xy, ξy) over y ∈ Y − {x0},
extended by the state x0, for which we put ξ(x0) = t ∈ S0Y ⊆ S0X.
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We have to verify that x0 |=(X,ξ) ψ. We will prove the stronger statement x0 |=(X,ξ) ψ¯σ,
i.e.
t |=1X,θ ψ¯, (1)
where θ(aρ) = [[ρ]](X,ξ) for ρ ∈ MSub(ψ).
By induction over χ and naturality of predicate liftings, y |=(X,ξ) χ iff y |=(Xy ,ξy) χ for
y ∈ Y − {x0} and for every formula χ. In particular, y |=(X,ξ) Thτ (y)σ for all y ∈ Y − {x0},
i.e.
y |=(X,ξ) ρ ⇐⇒ y ∈ τ(aρ) (2)
for all ρ ∈ MSub(ψ). We prove by induction over ρ ∈ MSub(ψ) that
x0 |=(X,ξ) ρ ⇐⇒ x0 ∈ τ(aρ), (3)
which in connection with (2) yields
[[ρ]](X,ξ) ∩ Y = τ(aρ). (4)
The steps for boolean operations are straightforward. For L(ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ MSub(ψ), we have
x0 |=(X,ξ) L(ρ1, . . . , ρn)
⇐⇒ t ∈ [[L]]Y ([[ρi]](X,ξ) ∩ Y )i=1,...,n = [[L]]Y (τ(aρ1), . . . , τ(aρn))
⇐⇒ t |=1(Y,τ) L(aρ1 , . . . , aρn),
using naturality of [[L]] in the first step and the inductive hypothesis in the shape of (4)
in the subsequent equality. Since t |=(Y,τ) ψ¯, the last statement is equivalent to z0 |=(Z,ζ)
L(ρ1, . . . , ρn). By the definition of κ, this is equivalent to z0 ∈ κ(aL(ρ1,...,ρn)), which in turn
is equivalent to x0 ∈ τ(aL(ρ1,...,ρn)) by construction of (Y, τ, t, x0).
By (4) and naturality of predicate liftings, our remaining goal (1) reduces to t |=1Y,τ ψ¯,
which holds by construction.
Finally, we have to establish that the overall branching degree of the model is polyno-
mial in |ψ|. The model is recursively constructed from polynomial-size one-step models for
pairs whose second components are conjunctive clauses over atoms L(aρ1 , . . . , aρn), where
L(ρ1, . . . , ρn) is a subformula of ψ. Such conjunctive clauses are of at most quadratic size in
|ψ| (even O(|ψ| log |ψ|) if subformulas of ψ are represented by pointers into ψ); this proves
the claim.
Remark 3.7. While it is to be expected that the construction of polynomially branching
models depends on a condition like the OSPMP, it does not seem to be the case that the
precise formulation of this condition is implicit in the literature (not even for the trivially
copointed case). Note in particular that the polynomial bound depends only on the second
component of a one-step pair. This is crucial, as the first component of the one-step pair
constructed in the above proof may be of exponential size. When we say in the introduction
that the OSPMP can be obtained from off-the-shelf results (e.g. [9, 14, 15]), we refer to
polynomial-size model theorems in which the polynomial bound depends, in the notation
of Proposition 3.2, on |ψ|, which may be exponentially larger than |ψ1|; typically, only an
inspection of the given proofs shows that the bound can be sharpened to be polynomial in |ψ1|.
The proof of Theorem 3.5 leads to the following nondeterministic decision procedure.
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Algorithm 3.8. (Decide satisfiability of an F(Λ)-formula ψ) Let M have the OSPMP, and
let p, q be polynomial bounds as in Definition 3.1.
1. If rank(ψ) = 0, terminate successfully if ψ evaluates to ⊤, else unsuccessfully. Otherwise:
2. Take V and σ as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, and guess a conjunctive clause ψ¯ over Λ(V )
containing for each subformula L(ρ1, . . . , ρn) of ψ either L(aρ1 , . . . , aρn) or ¬L(aρ1 , . . . , aρn)
such that ψ¯σ propositionally entails ψ.
3. Guess a P(Y )-valuation τ for V and (t, x) ∈ SY with size(t, x) ≤ q(|ψ¯|), where Y =
{1, . . . , p(|ψ¯|)}, such that t |=1Y,τ ψ¯.
4. For each y ∈ Y , check recursively that Thτ (y)σ is satisfiable.
Since the rank decreases with each recursive call, the above algorithm can be implemented in
polynomial space, provided that Step 3 can be performed in polynomial space.
Definition 3.9. The one-step model checking problem is to check, given a string s, a finite
set X, A1, . . . , An ⊆ X, and L ∈ Λ n-ary, whether s represents some (t, x) ∈ SX and whether
t ∈ [[L]]X(A1, . . . , An).
This property and the above algorithm lead to a PSPACE bound for the modal logic. More-
over, for bounded-rank fragments, the polynomially branching shallow model property be-
comes a polynomial size model property, thus leading to an NP upper bound:
Corollary 3.10. Let M have the OSPMP.
1. If one-step model checking is in PSPACE, then the satisfiability problem of F(Λ) is in
PSPACE.
2. If one-step model checking is in P , then the satisfiability problem of Fn(Λ) is in NP for
every n ∈ N.
Proof. 1: By Algorithm 3.8.
2: Let p and q be polynomial bounds on the branching degree of supporting Kripke frames
and on the size of successor structures ξ(x) as guaranteed by Theorem 3.5. Let n ∈ N. Then
by Theorem 3.5, every satisfiable formula ψ ∈ Fn(Λ) is satisfiable in a model (X, ξ) such
that |X| ≤
∑n
i=0 p(|ψ|)
i =: N and size(ξ(x)) ≤ log(N)q(|ψ|) for all x ∈ X, where the second
inequality relies also on Convention 2.11. Thus, the entire representation size of the model
(X, ξ) is bounded by M := N log(N)q(|ψ|), which is polynomial in |ψ|. Thus, the following
non-deterministic algorithm decides satisfiability of ψ in polynomial time:
1. Guess a model (X, ξ) of size at most M
2. Check that (X, ξ) is an S-coalgebra.
3. Check that [[ψ]](X,ξ) 6= ∅.
The second step can be performed in polynomial time because one-step model checking is in
P . The third step can be performed in polynomial time by recursively computing extensions
[[φ]](X,ξ), again because one-step model checking is in P .
This generalises results for the modal logics K and T established in [13].
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Example 3.11. 1. Modal logics K and T : One-step model checking for K and T amounts
to checking a subset inclusion and, in the case of T , additionally an elementhood; this is
clearly in P . To verify the OSPMP for K, let (X, τ,A) be a one-step model of a one-step
pair (φ,ψ) over V ; w.l.o.g. ψ is a conjunctive clause over atoms a, where a ∈ V . For ¬a
in ψ, there exists xa ∈ A such that xa /∈ τ(a). Taking Y to be the set of these xa, we
obtain a polynomial-size one-step model (Y, τY , Y ) of (φ,ψ), where τY (a) = τ(a) ∩ Y for all
a. The construction for T is the same, except that the point x of the original one-step model
(X, τ,A, x) is retained in the carrier set Y , and becomes the point of the small model. By
Corollary 3.10, this reproves Ladner’s PSPACE upper bounds for K and T [20], as well as
Halpern’s NP upper bounds for bounded-rank fragments [13].
2. Conditional logic: It is easy to see that one-step model checking for CK , CK+ID , and
CK +MP is in P . (In particular, deciding whether a given string represents an element of
CfID(X) just amounts to checking subset inclusions. Moreover, deciding whether (f, x) ∈
CfMP (X), i.e. whether x ∈ A implies x ∈ f(A), can be done in polynomial time thanks to
the choice of default value for f ; cf. Example 2.12.2.)
To prove that CK has the OSPMP, let (X, τ, f) be a one-step model of a one-step pair
(φ,ψ), where w.l.o.g. ψ is a conjunctive clause
∧n
i=1 ǫi(ai ⇒ bi). If τ(ai) 6= τ(aj), fix an
element yij in the symmetric difference of τ(ai) and τ(aj). Moreover, if ǫi is negation, fix
zi ∈ f(τ(ai)) \ τ(bi). Let Y be the set of all yij and all zi. Let τY be the P(Y )-valuation
defined by τY (v) = τ(v) ∩ Y , and let fY ∈ Cf (Y ) be represented by the partial map taking
τY (ai) to f(τ(ai)) ∩ Y for all i (this is well-defined by construction of Y ). Then (Y, τY , fY )
is a one-step model of (φ,ψ). The cardinality of Y is quadradic in ψ, and the representation
size of fY is polynomial.
Thanks to the choice of default value, this construction of polynomial-size one-step models
works also for CK+ID . The construction for CK+MP is almost identical, except that the point
x of (X, τ, f, x) is retained in the small one-step model (Y, τY , fY , x); here, (fY , x) ∈ CfMP (Y )
due to the different choice of default value.
We thus obtain that CK , CK+ID , and CK+MP are in PSPACE (hence PSPACE-complete,
as these logics contain K and — in the case of CK+MP— T , respectively, as sublogics). This
has previously been proved using a detailed analysis of a labelled sequent calculus [22] (the
method of [22] yields an explicit polynomial bound on space usage which is not matched by
the generic algorithm). The NP upper bound for bounded-rank fragments of CK , CK+ID ,
and CK+MP arising from Corollary 3.10.2 is, to our knowledge, new.
3. Modal logics of quantitative uncertainty: Polynomial size model properties for one-step
logics have been proved for the logic of probability [9], the logic of upper probability [14], and
various logics of expectation [15]. As indicated in Remark 3.7, the polynomial bounds are
stated in the cited work as depending on the size of the entire one-step formula ψ; however,
inspection of the given proofs shows that the polynomial bound in fact depends only on the
number of likelihoods or expectations in ψ, respectively, and on the representation size of the
largest coefficient. By Proposition 3.2, it follows that the respective logics have the OSPMP.
Suitable complexity estimates for one-step model checking are also found in the cited work.
By the above results, it follows that the respective modal logics of quantitative uncertainty
are in PSPACE (hence PSPACE-complete, as one can embed KD by mapping ♦ to l( ) > 0),
and in NP when the modal nesting depth is bounded. For the modal logic of probability, a
proof of the PSPACE upper bound is sketched in [8]. The PSPACE upper bounds for the
remaining cases (e.g. the modal logic of upper probability and the various modal logics of
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expectation) seem to be new, if only for the reason that only the one-step versions of these
logics appear in the literature. Similarly, all NP upper bounds for bounded-rank fragments
are, to our knowledge, new. Moreover, the upper bounds extend easily to modal logics of
uncertainty with non-iterative axioms, e.g. an axiom a → l(a) ≥ p which states that the
present state remains stationary with likelihood at least p.
4 Extended Example: Elgesem’s modal logic of agency
There have been numerous approaches to capturing the notion of agents bringing about
certain states of affairs, one of the most recent ones being Elgesem’s modal logic of agency
([7] and references therein, [12]). Modal logics of agency play a role e.g. in planning and task
assignment in multi-agent systems (cf. e.g. [4, 18]).
Elgesem defines a logic with two modalities E and C (in general indexed over agents; all
results below easily generalise to the multi-agent case), read ‘the agent brings about’ and ‘the
agent is capable of realising’, respectively. The semantics is given by a class of conditional
frames (X, f : X → QX → PX) (Example 2.10.3), called selection function models in this
context. The clauses for the modal operators are
x |= Eφ iff x ∈ f(w)([[φ]]) and
x |= Cφ iff f(w)([[φ]]) 6= ∅.
The relevant class of selection function models (X, f) is defined by the conditions
(E1) f(x)(X) = ∅
(E2) f(x)(A) ∩ f(x)(B) ⊆ f(x)(A ∩B)
(E3) f(x)(A) ⊆ A.
It is shown in [7, 12] that the logic of agency is completely axiomatised by ¬C⊤, ¬C⊥,
Ea ∧ Eb → E(a ∧ b), Ea → a, and Ea → Ca. Notably, the agent is incapable of realising
what is logically necessary (¬C⊤), i.e. the notion of realising a state of affairs entails actual
attributability (this axiom is weaker than previous formulations using avoidability ; cf. the
baby food example in [7]). Monotonicity is not imposed. The axiom ¬C⊥ is due to [12].
Most of the information in selection function models (motivated by philosophical consid-
erations in [7]) is irrelevant for the semantics of E and C: one only needs to know whether
f(x)(A) is non-empty, and whether it contains x. Moreover, the selection function seman-
tics fails to be coalgebraic, as the naturality condition fails for the (generalised) predicate
lifting implicit in the clause for E. Both problems are easily remedied by moving to the
following coalgebraic semantics: put 3 = {⊥, ∗,⊤} (to represent the cases f(x)(A) = ∅,
x /∈ f(x)(A) 6= ∅, and x ∈ f(x)(A), respectively), and take as signature functor the 3-valued
neighborhood functor N3 given by N3(X) = Q(X) → 3 (with Q(X) denoting contravari-
ant powerset). We define the copointed functor A as the subfunctor of N3 × Id such that
(f, x) ∈ A(X) iff for all A,B ⊆ X,
(E1′) f(X) = ⊥
(E2′) f(A) ∧ f(B) ≤ f(A ∩B)
(E3a′) f(∅) = ⊥
(E3b′) f(A) = ⊤ =⇒ x ∈ A
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where ∧ and ≤ refer to the ordering ⊥ < ∗ < ⊤. We define a structure over A for the modal
logic of agency by
[[E]]XA = {f : Q → 3 | f(A) = ⊤}
[[C]]XA = {f : Q → 3 | f(A) 6= ⊥}.
Proposition 4.1. A formula of the modal logic of agency is satisfiable in a selection function
model iff it is satisfiable over A.
Proof. ‘Only if:’ Given a selection function model (X, f), define an N3-coalgebra (X, f˜ ) by
f˜(x)(A) =


⊤ if x ∈ f(x)(A)
∗ if x /∈ f(x)(A) 6= ∅
⊥ if f(x)(A) = ∅.
It is clear that (X, f˜) is an A-coalgebra and that x ∈ X satisfies the same formulas in (X, f˜ )
as in (X, f).
’If ’: Let (X, f) be an A-coalgebra. We can assume that |[[φ]](X,f)| 6= 1 for all formulas φ
(otherwise, form the coproduct of (X, f) with itself, so that each state has a twin satisfying
the same formulas). We define a selection function model (X, f¯) by
f¯(x)(A) =


A if f(x)(A) = ⊤
A− {x} if f(x)(A) = ∗
∅ if f(x)(A) = ⊥.
It is clear that (X, f¯) satisfies E1–E3. One shows by induction over the formula structure that
x ∈ X satsifies the same formulas in (X, f¯ ) as in (X, f), with the only non-trivial point being
that in the step for the modal operator C, one has to note that, by the above assumption,
[[φ]](X,f) − {x} 6= ∅ whenever f(x)([[φ]](X,f)) = ∗.
To avoid exponential explosion, we represent elements of N3(X), for X finite, using partial
maps f0 : Q(X) ⇀ 3. To enforce (E2
′), we let such an f0 represent the map f : Q(X) → 3
that maps B ⊆ X to the maximum of
∧n
i=1 f0(Ai), taken over all sets A1, . . . , An ⊆ X such
that
⋂
Ai = B and f0(Ai) is defined for all i; when no such sets exist, the maximum is
understood to be ⊥.
Lemma 4.2. Let f0 and f be as above.
1. Whenever f0(A) is defined, then f0(A) ≤ f(A).
2. Let b ∈ 3. Then f(A) ≥ b iff
⋂
{B ⊆ X | A ⊆ B, f0(B) ≥ b defined} = A.
3. The pair (f, x) satisfies (E1′) iff f0(X) is either undefined or equals ⊥.
4. The pair (f, x) satisfies (E2′).
5. The pair (f, x) satisfies (E3a′) iff
⋂
{A ⊆ X | f0(A) > ⊥ defined} 6= ∅.
6. The pair (f, x) satisfies (E3b′) iff whenever f0(A) = ⊤ is defined, then x ∈ A.
Proof. 1.: Trivial.
2.: ‘If’ is trivial. ‘Only if’: by assumption, A =
⋂n
i=1Bi for some Bi such that f0(Bi) ≥ b is
defined for all i; the claim follows immediately.
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3.: ‘Only if’ is immediate by 1., and ‘if’ holds because X =
⋂
Ai implies Ai = X for all i.
4.: By construction.
5.: Immediate by 2.
6.: ‘Only if’ holds by 1., and ‘if’ holds because f(B) = ⊤ implies that B =
⋂
Ai for sets Ai
such that f0(Ai) = ⊤ for all i.
By Lemma 4.2, it is immediate that one-step model checking is in P . To prove the OSPMP, let
(X, τ, f : Q(X)→ 3, x) be a one-step model of a one-step pair (φ,ψ) over V . By Remark 3.3,
we can assume that X is finite. Let the set Y ⊆ X consist of
• the element x;
• an element yab ∈ τ(a) \ τ(b) for each pair (a, b) ∈ V
2 such that τ(a) 6⊆ τ(b);
• an element za ∈
⋂
{τ(b) | b ∈ V, τ(a) ⊆ τ(b), f(τ(b)) > f(τ(a))} \ τ(a) for each a ∈ V (za
exists by (E2′)); and
• an element w0 ∈
⋂
{τ(b) | f(τ(b)) > ⊥} (w0 exists by (E2
′) and (E3a′)).
Put τY (a) = τ(a)∩Y for a ∈ V , and let fY be represented by the partial map f0 taking τY (a)
to f(τ(a)) (f0 is well-defined by construction of Y ). Then Y and (fY , x) are of polynomial
size in ψ, and (Y, τY ) |= φ. By Lemma 4.2, (fY , x) is in A(X), with the criterion for (E3a
′)
satisfied due to w0 ∈ Y . By Lemma 4.2.2, the za ∈ Y ensure that fY (τY (a)) = f(τ(a)) for all
a ∈ V , so that fY |=
1
(Y,τY )
ψ.
By Corollary 3.10, we obtain that the modal logic of agency is in PSPACE, and that
bounding the modal nesting depth brings the complexity down to NP. Both results (and even
decidability) seem to be new. In the light of the previous observation that the agglomeration
axiom Ea ∧ Eb → E(a ∧ b) tends to cause PSPACE-hardness [31], we conjecture that the
PSPACE upper bound is tight.
5 Exponential Branching
In cases where the OSPMP fails, it may still be possible to obtain a PSPACE upper bound
by traversing an exponentially branching shallow model (by Remark 3.3, branching is never
worse than exponential). The crucial prerequisite is that exponential-size one-step models
can be traversed pointwise, accumulating during the traversal a polynomial amount of infor-
mation that suffices for one-step model checking. This requires additional assumptions on the
signature functor S0:
Definition 5.1. We say that S0 is pointwise bounded w.r.t. a set C if for all sets X, there
exists an injection S0X →֒ (X → C) (i.e. |S0X| ≤ |X → C|). We then identify S0X with a
subset of X → C.
(Note that the above does not require that λX.X → C is functorial.) Recall from [27] that
the signature functor S0 admits a separating set of unary predicate liftings (separation is
a necessary condition for the generalised Hennessy-Milner property) iff the family of maps
S0f : S0X → S02, indexed over all maps f : X → 2 = {⊥,⊤}, is jointly injective for each
set X. Typically, functors S0 satisfying this condition satisfy the stronger requirement that
already the family of maps (S01{x} : S0X → S02)x∈X is jointly injective, where 1A denotes
the characteristic function of A ⊆ X, so that S0 is pointwise bounded w.r.t. S02; often, even
a quotient of S02 will suffice. Of the signature functors mentioned in Example 2.10, P and
Dω are pointwise bounded (w.r.t. 2 and [0, 1], respectively), while Cf and P ◦Dω fail to be so.
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Further examples of pointwise bounded functors include the game frame functor appearing
in the semantics of coalition logic [29] and the multiset functor introduced below.
Assume from now on that S0 is pointwise bounded w.r.t. C, with a given representation
of elements of C (Convention 2.11 is no longer needed). For t : X → C, we define
maxsize(t) = max
x∈X
size(t(x)),
and put maxsize(t, x) = maxsize(t) for x ∈ X.
Definition 5.2. We say that M has the one-step pointwise polysize model property
(OSPPMP) if there exists a polynomial p such that, whenever a one-step pair (φ,ψ) over V
has a one-step model (X, τ, t, x), then it has a one-step model (Y, κ, s, y) such that |Y | ≤ 2|V |,
maxsize(s) ≤ p(|ψ|), and y ∈ κ(a) iff x ∈ τ(a) for all a ∈ V ; such a model is called pointwise
polysize.
By Remark 3.3, the actual content of the OSPPMP is the polynomial bound on maxsize(s).
The OSPPMP holds for all pointwise bounded functors mentioned so far, trivially so in cases
where C is finite. We have a variant of Theorem 3.5, proved entirely analogously, which states
that under the OSPPMP, every satisfiable formula ψ is satisfied in a shallow model (X, ξ)
with branching degree at most 2|ψ| and maxsize(ξ(x)) polynomially bounded in |ψ|. For the
ensuing algorithmic treatment, we need a refined notion of one-step model checking:
Definition 5.3. The pointwise one-step model checking problem is to check, given a map
t : X → C, x ∈ X, a P(X)-valuation τ for V , Y ⊆ X, and a conjunctive clause ψ over Λ(V ),
whether (t, x) ∈ SY ⊆ (X → C)×X and t |=1Y,τY ψ, where τY (a) = τ(a) ∩ Y for a ∈ V . We
say that this problem is PSPACE-tractable if it is decidable on a non-deterministic Turing
machine with input tape that uses space polynomial in maxsize(t) and accesses each input
symbol at most once.
Theorem 5.4. If M has the OSPPMP and pointwise one-step model checking is PSPACE-
tractable, then the satisfiability problem of F(Λ) is in PSPACE.
Proof. LetM be a decision procedure for pointwise one-step model checking as required in the
definition of PSPACE-tractability (Defn. 5.3). Let p be a polynomial witnessing the OSPPMP
as in Definition 5.2. Then the following non-deterministic algorithm decides satisfiability of
F(Λ)-formulas:
Algorithm 5.5. 1. If rank(ψ) = 0, terminate successfully if ψ evaluates to ⊤, else unsuc-
cessfully. Otherwise:
2. Take V and σ as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, and guess a conjunctive clause ψ¯ over Λ(V )
containing for each subformula L(ρ1, . . . , ρn) of ψ either L(aρ1 , . . . , aρn) or ¬L(aρ1 , . . . , aρn)
such that ψ¯σ propositionally entails ψ.
3. CallM with argumentsX, τ, Y, t as in Definition 5.3 to check that t ∈ TY and t |=1(Y,τY ) ψ¯,
with τY as in Definition 5.3. Here, X = 2
V , τ(a) = {B ∈ X | a ∈ B},
Y = {B ∈ X |
∧
aρ∈B
ρ ∧
∧
aρ /∈B
¬ρ satisfiable}
is calculated recursively, and t ∈ (X → C) with maxsize(t) ≤ p(|φ|) is guessed.
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It remains to see that the above algorithm can be implemented in polynomial space although
the input to M in Step 3 is of overall exponential size. This is achieved by replacing read
operations on the input tape inM by calls to a procedure passed by the caller, which produces
the k-th input symbol on demand, and then calling the modified pointwise model checker M ′
with such a procedure instead of the full argument. By the assumption that M accesses each
symbol on the input tape at most once, there is no need to keep the symbols representing the
guessed value t in memory after they have been passed to M ′. Therefore, only polynomial
space overhead is generated by the input to M ′ (the input procedure depends on φ and hence
has representation size O(|φ|)); the space usage of M ′ itself is polynomial in maxsize(t) and
therefore in |φ|.
Example 5.6. Theorem 5.4 applies e.g. to the modal logics K and T , as well as to prob-
abilistic modal logic; however, as all these logics in fact enjoy the OSPMP, the method of
Sect. 3 is preferable in these cases. A more interesting application is given by graded modal
logic [11], or more generally Presburger modal logic [6].
In its single-agent version, Presburger modal logic has n-ary modal operators∑n
i=1 ai#( ) ∼ b, where b and the ai are integers and ∼∈ {<,>,=} ∪ {≡k| k ∈ N}. A
coalgebraic semantics for this logic, equivalent for purposes of satisfiability to the ordered
tree semantics given in [6], is defined over the finite multiset functor B, which maps a set X
to the set of maps B : X → N with finite support, the intuition being that B is a multiset
containing x ∈ X with multiplicity B(x). For A ⊆ X, put B(A) =
∑
x∈AB(x). B-coalgebras
are graphs with N-weighted edges. The above modalities are interpreted by
[[
∑n
i=1 ai#( ) ∼ b]]X(A1, . . . , An) = {B ∈ B(X) |
∑n
i=1 aiB(Ai) ∼ b},
with >,<,= interpreted as expected, and ≡k as equality modulo k. This logic extends graded
modal logic, whose operators ♦k now become #( ) > k.
Of course, B is pointwise bounded w.r.t. N. It follows easily from estimates on solution sizes
of integer linear equalities [24] that Presburger modal logic has the OSPPMP [6]. Moreover,
given a conjunctive clause ψ over Λ(V ), a P(X)-valuation τ , and B ∈ B(X), one can check
whether B |=1X,τ ψ by traversing X and computing the B(τ(a)) by successive summation; it is
thus easy to see that pointwise one-step model checking is PSPACE-tractable. It follows that
Presburger modal logic is in PSPACE. While this is proved already in [6], using essentially the
same type of algorithm1, our method extends straightforwardly to extensions of Presburger
modal logic by certain frame conditions such as reflexivity (modelled by the copointed functor
SX = {(B,x) ∈ BX×X | B(x) > 0}) or e.g. the condition that at least half of all transitions
from a given state are loops (modelled by the copointed functor SX = {(B,x) ∈ BX ×X |
B(x) ≥ B(X−{x}}). In particular, this implies that graded modal logic over reflexive frames
(i.e. the logic Tn of [11]) is in PSPACE, to our knowledge a new result. The logic Tn can be
seen as a description logic with qualified number restrictions on a single reflexive role. Our
arguments extend straightforwardly to show that a description logic with role hierarchies,
reflexive roles, and qualified number restrictions has concept satisfiability over the empty T -
box in PSPACE. As reflexivity of a role R is expressed by the role inclusion id(⊤) ⊆ R, where
id(⊤) denotes the identity role, this logic is a fragment of ALCHQ(id) [1].
1The claim that a (rank-1) logic further extended by regularity constraints is still in PSPACE is retracted
in the full version of [6] as being based on possibly erroneous third-party results.
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6 Conclusion
We have formulated two local semantic conditions that guarantee PSPACE upper bounds
for the satisfiability problem of modal logics in a coalgebraic framework: the OSPMP (one-
step polysize model property) and its pointwise variant, the OSPPMP, which is weaker but
relies on additional assumptions on the coalgebraic semantics. Both conditions allow a direct
construction of shallow models and their traversal in polynomial space. This complements
earlier work [29] where syntactic criteria have been used — in particular, both the OSPMP
and the OSPPMP can be applied even when no complete axiomatisation of the logic at hand
is known. Several instantiations of our results to logics studied in the literature witness both
their generality and their usefulness: Apart from re-proving known PSPACE upper bounds
for the normal modal logics K and T as well as for the conditional logics CK , CK+ID , and
CK+MP , we have
• given a systematic account of tight PSPACE upper bounds in modal logics of quantitative
uncertainty that establishes new complexity bounds in some cases;
• obtained a new PSPACE upper bound for Elgesem’s modal logic of agency and for graded
(even Presburger [6]) modal logic over reflexive frames [11], and more generally for an exten-
sion of the description logic ALCHQ with reflexive roles [1];
• established (to our knowledge: new) tight NP upper bounds for bounded-rank fragments
of the conditional logics CK , CK+ID , and CK+MP .
Ongoing work focusses on the extension of our results to iterative modal logics, defined by
frame conditions of higher rank, which however — in particular outside the realm of Kripke
semantics — exhibit a tendency towards higher complexity or even undecidability (indeed, it
seems to be the case that all known iterative PSPACE-complete modal logics are normal).
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